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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION IN THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT'
INTRODUCTION
To establish a prima facie discrimination claim under Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")2' the plaintiff "must show that
(1) she is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA, (2) she is
able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reason-
able accommodation, and (3) she suffered an adverse employment deci-
sion because of ... her disability. 3 This survey examines the Tenth Cir-
cuit's consideration of what constitutes a "reasonable accommodation"
as addressed in element two of a prima facie discrimination claim under
the Americans with Disabilities Act.4
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit published thirteen cases
that address the interpretation of what constitutes a reasonable accom-
modation.6 Other circuits heard a comparable number of similar cases.
1. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). The ADA
was enacted on July 26, 1990.
2. See generally Larry E. Craig, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Prologue, Promise,
Product and Performance, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 205 (1999). Senator Craig was a member of Congress
during the debate and enactment of the ADA, and thus provides an authentic view of the ADA
provisions. Title I relates to employment and is the focus of this survey.
3. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 157 F.3d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 1998).
4. The survey period runs September 1, 1998 through August 31, 1999.
5. This survey does not discuss at least seventeen unpublished cases dealing with
unreasonable accommodation during the same survey period.
6. Some of the cases dealt only with "reasonable accommodation" as an ancillary issue. The
thirteen cases are Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussed in Part
IV); Butler v. Prairie Village, 172 F.3d 736 (10th Cir. 1999) (relating to ADA cases without direct
evidence of discrimination and the applicability of the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)); EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241 (10th
Cir. 1999) (relating to the burden that a plaintiff must carry); Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216 (10th
Cir. 1999) (relating to accommodation in an arrest situation); Hardy v. S.F. Phosphates Ltd., 185
F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 1999) (relating to the analytical framework of McDonnell Douglas and the
ability of an employer to defend by showing a nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's action);
J.B. ex rel Hart v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 1999) (abstaining from exercising jurisdiction
over a proposed class action suit by handicapped children in the custody of the state in order to avoid
undue interference with the state's conduct of its own affairs); Marcus v. Kansas, 170 F.3d 1305
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This would indicate that the courts are giving considerable attention to
what constitutes a reasonable accommodation.
Part II of this survey examines the background of the ADA and re-
views the ADA's pertinent parts. Part III examines Smith v. Midland
Brake, Inc.,' a case in which the Tenth Circuit reconsidered and ex-
panded the reasonable accommodation concept. Part IV analyzes the
reasoning of other Tenth Circuit reasonable accommodation cases, and
Part V compares the Tenth Circuit's reasoning to the reasoning of the
two circuits in disagreement with the Tenth Circuit.
Finally, Part VI of this survey concludes that the Tenth Circuit's rea-
soning is not only in harmony with the majority of the other circuits, but
that the Tenth Circuit might have established itself as a leader in this
important ADA adjudication area.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE ADA
A. History and Development of the ADA
The National Council on the Handicapped in the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (the "National Council") compiled the
studies and prepared the report that led to the development of the ADA. 9
Congress' findings' ° and the ADA's purpose as stated in its preamble"
(10th Cir. 1999) (considering a suit brought by disabled citizens protesting the imposition of a fee
for parking placards); Martin v. Kansas, 190 F.3d 1120 (10th Cir. 1999) (joining the Second, Fourth,
Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in holding that the ADA, in requiring states not only to avoid
discrimination but to require reasonable accommodations to the known disabilities of employees,
does not run afoul of the "congruent and proportional requirement" of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997)); McGuinness v. University of N.M. School of Med., 170 F.3d 974 (10th Cir. 1998)
(discussed in Part IV); Nielsen v. Moroni Feed Co., 162 F.3d 604 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming that the
Company President's unsatisfactory conduct due to addiction to prescription pain-killing drugs did
not warrant protection under ADA); Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300 (10th Cir. 1999) (relating
to sleeping being a major life activity); Poindexter v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 168
F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 1999) (relating to an HIV infection imposing significant limitations on major
life activities and whether a major life activity is a legal issue); Roberts v. Progressive Independence,
Inc., 183 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1999) (relating to the employer failing to provide reasonable
accommodation for an employee with cerebral palsy going on a business trip).
7. The number of the other circuits' "reasonable accommodation" cases, published within
this survey period, are as follows: First Circuit-seven; Second Circuit-twelve; Third Circuit-
eight; Fourth Circuit-eleven; Fifth Circuit-fifteen; Sixth Circuit-thirty-five; Seventh Circuit-
sixteen; Eighth Circuit-twenty-seven; Ninth Circuit-seventeen; and Eleventh Circuit--eight. Part
IV, infra, further considers these cases.
8. 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999).
9. See Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., Historical Background of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
64 TEMP. L. REV. 387, 389 (1991) (revealing former Senator Weicker's perspective, as an original
Senate sponsor of the ADA, on the history and background leading to the introduction of the ADA).
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994).
11. The ADA states its purpose as:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
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are the direct result of the National Council's report. 2 Congress enacted
the ADA to provide a "clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities."' 3 To
accomplish this, the ADA expanded the basic principles of the Rehabili-
14tation Act of 1973, which pertained only to federal government em-
ployees, recipients of federal financial assistance, and federal contrac-
tors.'5 The ADA strives both to eliminate discrimination against people
with disabilities and to create a cause of action for qualified16 people who
have faced discrimination. Courts rely on cases involving the Rehabilita-
tion Act to interpret the more recently enacted ADA, 7 each having the
common purpose "to prevent old-fashioned and unfounded prejudices
against disabled persons from interfering with those individuals' rights to





B. Pertinent Provisions of the ADA
The ADA states, "No covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advance-
ment, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training,
and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."'
9
Although the ADA contains several important concepts and defini-
tions,' ° this Tenth Circuit survey focuses only on the concept of "reason-able accommodation," which may include:
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the
standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities;
and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to en-
force the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address
the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1-4).
12. See Weicker, supra note 9, at 390. The National Council issued its report in February
1986. See Weicker, supra note 9, at 390.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
14. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-94 (1994).
15. See Weicker, supra note 9, at 387-88.
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining "a qualified individual with a disability").
17. See, e.g., Coleman v. Zatechka, 824 F.Supp. 1360, 1367 (D.Neb. 1993).
18. Galloway v. Superior Ct., 816 F.Supp. 12, 20 (D.D.C. 1993).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
20. See generally Louis C. Rabaut, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Duty of
Reasonable Accommodation, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 721 (1993).
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making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(2) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reas-
signment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommoda-
tions for individuals with disabilities.2'
Whereas Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 encouraged em-
ployers to hire people based on their job qualifications, rather than based
on race, sex, or other factors unrelated to the position, 22 the Rehabilita-
tion Act provided protection from discrimination to disabled persons."
Similarly, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
("ADEA") prohibited certain acts of discrimination against older indi-
viduals.24 Thus, the ADA requires consideration of a person with a dis-
ability while Title VII does not permit consideration of a personal char-
acteristic such as sex or race in making employment decisions. Further,
the ADA draws a number of its terms and definitions both from the Re-
habilitation Act and from Title VII.25 Thus, the "employment decisions
covered by this nondiscrimination mandate [are] to be construed in a
manner consistent with the regulations implementing section 504 of the
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
22. Title VI makes the following unlawful:
[T]o fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin ...or ...to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
23. The Rehabilitation Act provides:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as de-
fined in section 706(8) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his dis-
ability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Ex-
ecutive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
24. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (stating that it is unlawful for an
employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age.") (emphasis added).
25. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. (1999).
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Rehabilitation Act of 1973. "26 Further, the ADA expressly provides that
Title VIl's "powers, remedies, and procedures" apply."
C. Reasonable Accommodation under the ADA
1. ADA's Definition of Reasonable Accommodation
The ADA defines "qualified individual with a disability" as "an indi-
vidual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation,
can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such
individual holds or desires .... .""
The ADA requires employers to provide some "reasonable accom-
modation" to applicants or employees with known physical or mental
disabilities who are "otherwise qualified individuals" unless doing so
will create an "undue hardship" for employers. 29 Rather than defining
exactly what an employer must do to comply, the ADA gives examples
of what a reasonable accommodation might include." The result is that
an employer might recognize a requirement to provide a reasonable ac-
commodation, but the ADA does not clearly define the required extent of
the employer's involvement.
2. Congress' Requirement of the EEOC
Congress requires the EEOC to issue regulations to carry out the
ADA's goals." Regarding reasonable accommodations, the EEOC regu-
lations, like the ADA, discuss only potential accommodations and what
the accommodations might include.
32
26. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.4.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994).
28. 42U.S.C. § 12111(8).
29. See generally Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Employment Provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Part I-Workplace Accommodations, 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 877
(1997). A reasonable accommodation is a "modification or adjustment to a workplace process or
environment that makes it possible for a qualified person with a disability to perform essential job
functions, such as physical modifications to a work space, flexible scheduling of duties, or provision
of assistive technologies to aid in job performance." Id. at 892.
30. According to the ADA, the term "reasonable accommodation" may include:
[M]aking existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and us-
able by individuals with disabilities; and job restructuring, part-time or modi-
fied work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modifi-
cation of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers
or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with dis-
abilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994) (stating that the EEOC "shall issue regulations ... to carry
out this subchapter ....").
32. See 29 C.F.R. pt § 1630.2(o)(2), (3).
2000] 429
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To further clarify its regulations, the EEOC has issued an "interpretive
guidance" appendix.33 According to the appendix, an employer has a duty
to make reasonable efforts to determine an appropriate accommodation
once an employee has requested such accommodation.34 However, the
interpretive guidance specifically states that employers need only ac-
commodate "known" disabilities." The guidance also notes the impor-
tance of communication between the employer and employee in order to
36
determine a reasonable accommodation. To further assist employers to
determine what constitutes a proper reasonable accommodation, the in-
terpretive guidance suggests a four-step process: (1) the employer ascer-
tains a job's essential functions; (2) the employer consults with the dis-
abled individual to determine the individual's limitations and possible
ways to accommodate those limitations; (3) the employer further con-
sults with the disabled employee to weigh the potential effectiveness of
the possible accommodations; and (4) the employer selects a reasonable
accommodation that does not create an undue hardship for the
employer.37
3. Summary of the Interpretation of Reasonable Accommodation
Because the concept of "reasonable accommodation" originated in
regulations issued by the EEOC in implementation of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, courts look to the decisions interpreting the EEOC regula-
tions for clues to the meaning of the same terms in the ADA.
Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner explained that the term "ac-
commodation" plainly means that the "employer must be willing to con-
sider making changes in ordinary work rules, facilities, terms, and con-
ditions in order to enable a disabled individual to work," but that the term
"reasonable" is more difficult. 38 The judge interpreted the modifier "rea-
sonable" as qualifying or weakening the word "accommodation,, 39 add-
ing that the court must also consider costs to decide what is reasonable.
4
0





38. Vande Zande v. Wisconsin, 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995).
39. See Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 542 (stating that "in just the same way that if one requires a
,reasonable effort' of someone this means less than the maximum possible effort, or in law that the
duty of 'reasonable care,' the cornerstone of the law of negligence, requires something less than the
maximum possible care").
40. See id. (suggesting Judge Learned Hand's negligence formula in United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2nd Cir. 1947) be used to "flesh out the meaning of the word
'reasonable' in the term 'reasonable accommodations."'). Judge Posner further explains the
economic aspects:
It would not follow that the costs and benefits of altering a workplace to en-
able a disabled person to work would always have to be quantified, or even
[Vol. 77:3
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In the absence of statutory guidance, courts differ on the need for an
employer to participate in an interactive process. Courts not deferring to
the EEOC regulations apply the traditional Title VII burden-shifting
formula41 to ADA cases, requiring the disabled individual to show that
actual accommodations exist. Under the burden-shifting formula, an em-
42
ployee first must prove that a reasonable accommodation is possible.
The burden then shifts to the employer to show that providing such an
43
accommodation would create an undue hardship. Ultimately, the em-
ployee must show both an ability to perform the job and that the em-
ployer failed to provide a reasonable accommodation."
II. TENTH CIRCUIT DECISION-SMITH V. MIDLAND BRAKE, INC.
["MIDLAND BRAKE lI"]
41
The Tenth Circuit, in Midland Brake II, reconsidered what constitutes
• ,,46
a "reasonable accommodation. Section A of this Part recites the facts
of both Midland Brake cases. Section B discusses the findings of Mid-
that an accommodation would have to be deemed unreasonable if the cost ex-
ceeded the benefit however slightly. But, at the very least, the cost could not
be disproportionate to the benefit. Even if an employer is so large or wealthy .
• .that it may not be able to plead "undue hardship," it would not be required
to expend enormous sums in order to bring about a trivial improvement in the
life of a disabled employee.
Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 542-43. Judge Posner justifies this conclusion by analyzing the wording of
the ADA, reasoning:
If the nation's employers have potentially unlimited financial obligations to 43 million
disabled persons, the Americans with Disabilities Act will have imposed an indirect
tax potentially greater than the national debt. We do not find an intention to bring
about such a radical result in either the language of the Act or its history. The preamble
actually "markets" the Act as a cost saver, pointing to "billions of dollars in
unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity." § 12101(a)(9).
The savings will be illusory if employers are required to expend many more billions in
accommodation than will be saved by enabling disabled people to work.
Id. at 543.
41. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973) (defining the three-
step process of ordering and allocating burdens of proof. First, the plaintiff must establish a prima
facie case of discrimination. Second, the burden shifts to the defendant/employer to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision. Third, the plaintiff again has the
burden to prove that the employer's reason was mere pretext.).
42. See White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 361 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that the plaintiff
must produce "evidence sufficient to make a facial showing that accommodation is possible").
43. See id.
44. See id. (stating that the ultimate burden of persuasion rests with the employee/plaintiff).
45. 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (hereinafter "Midland Brake 11").
46. See id.
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land Brake 1.47 Section C discusses the findings in Midland Brake H1.48
Finally, Section D analyzes the holdings of both Midland Brake cases.
A. Facts of Midland Brake t9
Plaintiff Smith encountered various chemicals on a daily basis during
seven years of employment at Midland Brake in the light assembly de-
partment.0 Eventually, Smith developed a chronic dermatitis on his
hands so severe that Smith's physicians considered him'permanently
disabled' and unfit to work in the light assembly department."5' Because
of the inability to accommodate his medical problem in the light assem-
bly department, Midland Brake fired Smith.52
The district court granted Midland Brake's summary judgment mo-
tion on Smith's claims alleging violations of the ADA, the ADEA, and
the Kansas Retaliatory Discharge Law.53
B. Decision of Midland Brake 154
In Midland Brake I, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's
judgment. The court held that Smith was not a "qualified individual with
a disability" 55 because no amount of accommodation would allow Smith
to perform his existing job.
C. Decision of Midland Brake H 57
One year later, in Midland Brake II, the Tenth Circuit, en banc, con-
sidered two ADA questions.
47. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 138 F.3d 1304 (10th Cir. 1998) (hereinafter "Midland
Brake I").
48. Midland Brake I1, 180 F.3d 1154.
49. Midland Brake !, 138 F.3d 1304.
50. See id. at 1307. Smith's employment began in 1987, three years before enactment of the
ADA. See id.
51. Id. at 1308.
52. See id. at 1307.
53. See id. at 1306. Smith's wife substituted herself as the Plaintiff/Appellant, because Smith
died while awaiting appeal. See Midland Brake I1, 180 F.3d at 1160 n.2.
54. Midland Brake 1, 138 F.3d 1304.
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994) ("The term 'qualified individual with a disability' means
an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.").
56. See Midland Brake 1, 138 F.3d at 1312.
57. Midland Brake 11, 180 F.3d 1154.
[Vol. 77:3
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1. First Question of Midland Brake 11 58
First, the court considered "whether an employee can be a 'qualified
individual with a disability,' when that employee is unable to perform the
essential functions of his or her present job, regardless of the level of
accommodation offered, but could perform the essential functions of
other available jobs within the company with or without a reasonable
accommodation." 9
The court relied on the ADA's statutory framework to decide the first
question.60 Here, the court focused on the last two words-"or desires"-
of the definition of a "qualified individual with a disability. '6' The court
reasoned that the ADA's plain language meant that Midland Brake
should not have limited the job search to a job within Smith's division,
otherwise the words "or desires" would be superfluous.62 Consequently,
63the court held that Smith was a qualified individual with a disability.
2. Second Question of Midland Brake Il
Second, the court considered the scope of the employer's obligation
to offer a qualified individual with a disability a different job if an em-
ployee cannot perform an existing job.64 The court carefully examined
the language of other circuit decisions, the EEOC Interpretive Guidance,
65the ADA, and the ADA's legislative history, which states:
Reasonable accommodation may also include reassignment to a
vacant position. If an employee, because of disability, can no
longer perform the essential functions of the job that she or he has
held, a transfer to another vacant job for which the person is quali-
fied may prevent the employee from being out of work and [the]
employer from losing a valuable worker. 66
Then, the court focused on the "re" in the word reassignment.67 The
court reasoned that the statute's plain language implied that the employee
already had an assignment in the company, and thus would be an existing
employee. 68 Further, stating "reassignment" rather than "consideration of
a reassignment" means "something more than the mere opportunity to
58. See id.
59. Id. at 1159.
60. See id. at 1160.
61. See id.; see also supra note 55.
62. See Midland Brake 11, 180 F.3d at 1160.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 1161-70.
65. See id. at 1162.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 1163-64.
68. See id. at 1164 (rejecting Midland Brake's assertion that the phrases only. apply to
applicants and not to present employees).
2000]
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apply for a job with the rest of the world."'69 Therefore, the court con-
cluded both that the company must reassign the disabled employee to the
position and that the disabled employee need not compete with other
70employees or job applicants. Consequently, the court held that Midland
71
Brake must offer Smith another job within the company.
D. Analysis of the Midland Brake Decisions.
In Midland Brake I, the court came to a harsh conclusion by deciding
that Smith was not a qualified individual with a disability, because Smith
could not work in the chemical-laden light assembly department, re-
gardless of the amount of accommodation offered.72 Thus, the court ex-
cluded Smith, undeniably a person with a disability, from the class of
"qualified person with a disability." Midland Brake I did not logically
flow from the ADA in two ways. First, the decision did not "provide
clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination
against individuals with disabilities," as mandated by the ADA's state-
ment of purpose. Second, the decision did not consider the statute's plain
language because the decision ignored the phrase "or desires. 74
On the other hand, Midland Brake II appears to be a "fair" ruling that
gave a favorable outcome to a clearly disabled employee consistent with
the ADA's purpose.75 The decision logically flowed from both the textual
interpretation of the ADA and from the legislative intent. Specifically,
the court carefully explained the wording of both the ADA and its legis-
lative intent to arrive at a conclusion that is difficult to fault when con-
sidering the clear language upon which the conclusion relies.
76
III. OTHER TENTH CIRCUIT REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION CASES
This part of the survey analyzes three other "reasonable accommoda-
tion" cases considered by the Tenth Circuit, showing how the court de-
termined whether the accommodation was reasonable.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 1166-67 (pointing out that there is some consideration involved-the "process of
consideration is necessarily a component of the act of reassignment itself").
71. See id. at 1167.
72. See id. at 1308.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (1994).
74. See id.§ 12111(8).
75. See id. § 12101(b)(1) (stating that the purpose of the ADA is to "provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities... ").
76. For a complete list of published cases on "reasonable accommodation" during this survey
period, as. well as a brief description of each case see supra note 9. The author chose these three
cases as especially illustrative of the Tenth Circuit's reasoning.
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A. Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co.
7
1. Facts:
Coors hired Anderson, who suffered from Multiple Sclerosis (MS),
78
"as a temporary production operator (TPO). '79 Coors used TPO's in a
variety of positions throughout the plant, on an "as needed" basis. ° An-
derson worked in several capacities, one being "above the ovens" on a
ladder, catching cans from a conveyor belt.8' Working in this capacity,
Anderson became ill and requested accommodations upon returning to
work.82 After examining the requested accommodations, Coors deter-
mined that Anderson could not perform the requisite functions of a TPO
and terminated Anderson's employment." Anderson sued under the
ADA, but the district court granted Coors' summary judgment motion,
which argued that Anderson, even with reasonable accommodations, was
not qualified for the TPO position.84
2. Decision:
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment
order. The court declared that the TPO position had a legitimate business85
purpose. Limiting Anderson's job to conform to the accommodations
would defeat the business purpose of the TPO, essentially creating a new
86
position for Anderson. Because Anderson could not perform the TPO
job requirements, with or without accommodation, Anderson "failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA." 87
On first inspection, Anderson appears to conflict with Midland Brake
H, because Anderson did not require the employer to find another suit-
able job within the company. However, in Anderson, Coors had a legiti-
88mate business purpose for the TPO, by definition a temporary position.
Granting Anderson's requested accommodations would have essentially
rewritten the job description, creating a new job within Coors and de-
77. 181 F.3d 1171 (1OthCir. 1999).
78. See Anderson, 181 F.3d at 1174-75 (explaining that Multiple Sclerosis limited Anderson
from, among other things, working in hot environments, standing for long periods of time, lifting
heavy objects and (because of dizziness) working on ladders or at heights).





84. See Anderson, 181 F.3d at 1175 (finding also that Anderson failed to demonstrate that the
reason for termination was pretextual).
85. See id. at 1177.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 1177-78.
88. See id. at 1177.
2000]
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feating the business purpose of the TPO.s9 This result was fair to the em-
ployee, whom Coors hired on a temporary basis to perform a specific
business purpose.
C. McGuinness v. University of New Mexico School of Medicine9O
1. Facts:
Former medical student McGuinness suffered from an anxiety disor-91
der that manifested during math or chemistry exams. Rather than accept
the Medical School's offer to repeat the first year, McGuinness chose to
file suit under the ADA.9' The district court granted summary judgment
to the medical school because McGuinness did not have a disability un-
der the ADA. The court did not reach the reasonable accommodation
issue.9'
2. Decision:
The Tenth Circuit affirmed that McGuiness did not have a disability
under the ADA and then considered the reasonable accommodation is-
sue.94 The court held that McGuinness's request for advancement to the
medical school's next level was a substantial, rather than a reasonable,
accommodation. 5
Here, as in Midland Brake II, the court examined the ADA's plain
language. While being fair, the court showed that it would not accept just
any accommodation. The accommodation must be truly reasonable, in
96the plain meaning of the word, and not substantial.
D. EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
97
1. Facts:
Because a hearing-impaired employee left a mandatory training ses-
sion, Wal-Mart first demoted and then terminated the employee. 9s The
89. See id.
90. 170 F.3d. 974 (10th Cir. 1998).
91. See McGuinness, 170 F.3d at 976 (explaining that McGuinness had previously earned
Bachelor of Science degrees in chemistry and biology; a degree in physiological psychology; and a
doctorate in psychology by developing study habits to overcome the "anxiety disorder" disability).
92. See id. at 977 (stating that another basis of McGuinness's claim was on the "association
discrimination" provision, 42 U.S.C. § 121112(B)(4) (1994) because McGuinness has a disabled son
with cerebral palsy).
93. See id. (noting also that McGuinness had failed to distinguish between Title I and Title II
of the ADA. The district court did not allow McGuinness's attempt to amend in response to the
motion for summary judgment.)
94. See id.
95. See id. at 979.
96. See id.
97. 187 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1999).
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employee could not understand the videotaped session because Wal-Mart
provided neither closed captioning nor an interpreter. 99
2. Decision:
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's award of punitive
damages against Wal-Mart.'00 The court held that Wal-Mart's managers
"engaged in recklessly indifferent intentional discrimination" against the
employee because Wal-Mart had not provided an interpreter as a reason-
able accommodation. 0'
This result sent the same message to the employer that the
McGuiness court sent to the employee. Implicitly, the court showed that
fairness must prevail. Just as the court denied former medical student
McGuiness relief because McGuiness requested a substantial rather than
a reasonable accommodation, the court affirmed the punitive damage
award because Wal-Mart was "recklessly indifferent" to the disabled
employee's need for accommodation. 2
IV. OTHER CIRCUITS
The other circuits generally parallel the Tenth Circuit in interpreting
reasonable accommodation under the ADA."' This Part of the survey
examines the two circuits that differ.
A. Fourth Circuit: Myers v. Hose104
1. Facts:
When bus driver Myers developed medical problems and failed a
required biannual physical exam, supervisor Hose offered Myers termi-
nation under one of three circumstances. '°5 Myers declined and asked for
additional time to control the medical problems. '°6 When Hose refused,
Myers retired and sued, alleging discrimination based on a handicap.""
The district court granted summary judgment to Hose on all counts. '°8
98. See EEOC, 187 F.3d at 1243-44.
99. See id. at 1243.
100. See id. at 1248.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Midland Brake 11, 180 F.3d at 1162-63 (discussing the status of the support of the
other circuits).
104. 50 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 1995).
105. See Myers, 50 F.3d at 280-81.
106. See id.
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2. Decision:
The Fourth Circuit interpreted provisions in the ADA as containing
"no reference to an individual's future ability to perform the essential
functions of his position .... [T]hey are formulated entirely in the pres-
ent tense, framing the precise issue as whether an individual 'can' (not
'will be able to') perform the job .... ."'09 Thus, the Fourth Circuit stated,
"[T]he duty of reasonable accommodation does not encompass a respon-
sibility to provide a disabled employee with alternative employment
when the employee is unable to meet the demands of his present posi-
tion.""0
3. Analysis
By interpreting the ADA as applying only to the disabled individual's
ability to perform the demands of the present position, the Fourth Circuit
differs from the interpretation of the Tenth Circuit by giving more cre-
dence to the present tense of the wording than to the ADA's plain lan-
guage. The Fourth Circuit completely ignored the phrase "or desires.""'
B. Fifth Circuit: Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.
112
1. Facts:
Welder Foreman needed a pacemaker and could no longer work in
the welding area."' Employer Babcock & Wilcox ("B&W") denied
Foreman's request for an alternative job with equivalent seniority and
pay and offered Foreman a janitorial position instead.' "4 Foreman sued
under the ADA for B&W's failure to reasonably accommodate a disabil-
ity."15 The district court directed a verdict for B&W because Foreman
could no longer work at the present welding job, either with or without• 16
an accommodation.
109. Id. at 283.
110. Id. at 284 (emphasis added).
11. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8) (1994) ("A 'qualified
individual with a disability' [means] an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual
holds or desires.").
112. 117 F.3d 800 (5th Cir.1997).
113. See Foreman, 117 F.3d at 803 (indicating possible hazard from electromagnetic
interference with a pacemaker).
114. See id.
115. See id.




The Fifth Circuit held that Foreman's heart condition was not a dis-
ability under the ADA.'"7 Further, the court commented that even if the
heart condition were a disability, Foreman would not be a qualified indi-
vidual because Foreman was not medically qualified to perform his cur-
rent job."8 Going even further, the court noted that even if Foreman were
both "disabled" and "qualified," Foreman's requested accommodation
for a reassignment would be unreasonable as the reassignment violated a
collective bargaining agreement." 9 In any event, Foreman had offered no
evidence that the requested reassignment position had been available., 2°
3. Analysis
The Fifth Circuit differs in two fundamental ways from the Tenth
Circuit. First, the Fifth Circuit did not clearly base Foreman upon the
ADA's plain language. Consequently, Foreman does not lend itself to
consistent interpretation by lower courts.
Second, the Fifth Circuit lacks fairness by requiring the disabled em-
ployee to bear the burdens of proving both that an alternate job exists
within the company and that the disabled employee can perform that job,
rather than following the EEOC's recommended process.121
CONCLUSION
Without specifically defining "reasonable accommodation," the ADA
suggests broad-ranged possibilities to impart clarity. ' EEOC regulations
provide guidance as to what constitutes a reasonable accommodation,
indicating methods to determine whether a reasonable accommodation
exists. 1 3 Because "reasonable" for one employer might not mean "rea-
117. See id. at 806-07.
118. See id. at 809.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 807-10.
121. See 29 C.F.R. pt 1630, app. § 1630.9 (1999) (stating the first step is for the employer to
"[alnalyze the particular job involved and determine its purpose and essential functions... .
122. The term "reasonable accommodation" may include:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and us-
able by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a
vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appro-
priate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or poli-
cies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters and other similar ac-
commodations for individuals with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (Supp. 11 1990).
123. The EEOC provides:
200]
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sonable" for another, guidelines as to what constitutes "reasonable"
might prevent an employer from being subject to review. This under-
scores the need for the courts to provide a clear and consistent interpre-
tation of "reasonable."
Adding the thirty-some "reasonable accommodation" cases (thirteen
published) heard by the Tenth Circuit during this survey period and con-
sidering that each of the other circuits heard a similar number of like
cases indicates the importance the Tenth Circuit's position on ADA in-
terpretation. All but two of the circuits agree with the Tenth Circuit's
interpretation of "reasonable accommodation."
This shows how closely aligned the Tenth Circuit is with the other cir-
cuits on ADA interpretation. The Tenth Circuit, due to clear and consis-
tent reasoning, has established itself as a leader in ADA interpretation.
David William Becker, Jr. M.D.*
To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary
for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the
qualified individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This pro-
cess should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and
potential reasonable accommodations.that could overcome those limitations.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (1999).
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